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Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure
and Global Financial Regulation
Javier Alonso, Alfonso Arellano, and David Tuesta
A topic attracting attention in recent global regulatory discussions is the
possibility that private pension funds should invest in alternative assets,
particularly infrastructure projects.1 As defined by the OECD, this refers to
the system of public works in a country, state or region, including roads, utility lines
and public buildings. Infrastructure is typically used for performing long term
capital activities which provide essential services to the public. Infrastructure invest-
ments are expected to produce predictable and stable cash flows over the long
term. Infrastructure assets normally operate in an environment of limited compe-
tition as a result of natural monopolies, government regulation or concessions.
Investments are usually capital intensive and include a tangible asset that must be
operated and maintained over the long term. (Della Croce et al. 2011: 15–16)
Although there are relevant pros and cons to be considered by pension funds
when investing in infrastructure, there have been at least three alluring
factors that make it interesting for pension funds to invest in alternative assets.
First, these assets are attractive in terms of profitability and risk, and many
pension funds have had apparently successful experiences with them. Second,
there are arguments about the suitability of such long-maturity assets, given
institutional investors’ long-term horizons. Third, there are perceived needs
to fund infrastructure when governments have budgetary limitations and
banks are forced to disinvest from these assets due to financial regulation.
Against this backdrop, countries around the world are introducing regula-
tory changes to allow or increase pension fund investments in infrastructure.
Generally speaking, this means allowing pension funds to invest more in
specific projects and, at the same time, designing specific financial vehicles to
balance the investment criteria of pension fund members in terms of profile,
risk, returns, and portfolio diversification. Our goal in this chapter is to assess
the role of regulation on pension fund decisions to invest in this specific
financial asset. We carry out a quantitative analysis with the aim of shedding
some light on the different explanatory variables which might affect whether
or not pension funds invest in infrastructure, among them financial regulatory
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factors. In what follows, we first highlight the elements encouraging pension
funds to invest in infrastructure projects. Next, we analyze the pros and cons of
pension investments in this alternative asset. We then focus on financial
regulatory factors that interact with pension fund investments in infrastruc-
ture in different regions. We also offer an econometric analysis to assess which
factors are currently the most influential on pension funds investing in
infrastructure. We close with our key conclusions.
Factors Accelerating the Trend for Pension
Funds to Invest in Infrastructure
We have constructed a database for 72 pension funds across 21 countries,
where their investment menu includes investing in infrastructure (see
Table 10.1). For those countries currently investing in infrastructure, this
averages 5.6 percent. This average is influenced by two countries that actively
invest in infrastructure, namely Canada (6.6 percent) and Australia (8.6 per-
cent). Interestingly, in our sample, there are a dozen pension funds which
invest between 10 and 31 percent of their portfolios in unlisted infrastructure
assets. Moreover, Della Croce (2012) estimates that, between 2010 and 2013,
the world’s ten largest pension funds boosted their allocation to alternative
assets from 17.6 to 19.5 percent. Several factors have contributed to this trend.
The financial crisis
The straitjacketing of public spending in the wake of the financial crisis has
suppressed much infrastructure funding vital to economic growth.
The European Commission (2014c) suggests that Europe will need to
raise €1.5–2.0 trillion in funds for infrastructure investment by 2020, and the
US will seek $1.7–3.0 trillion by the same date. Several groups including
the European Commission (2014a, 2014b) seek formulas for co-financing by
the private sector. One reason is that banks, which had fulfilled this role
in the past, are now facing problems in providing funding, owing to the
restrictions imposed under Basel III, specifically under the Capital Require-
ment Regulation (CRR). Given this, the Commission has suggested that the
insurance and pension fund industry may be the ideal candidate to step in.
Pension funds and their role in the economy
There has been increasing support for pension funds investing in infrastruc-
ture, as a win-win situation for pension funds and macroeconomic stability
(Escrivá et al. 2010). Figure 10.1 shows the interaction between pension
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TABLE 10.1. Pension fund investment in infrastructure
Actual (%) Target (%) Year
Aust-Ausfund 0 10.0 2010
Aust-BUSS (Q) 17.9 0.0 2010
Aust-Care 6 0.0 2010
Aust-Catholic 0 5.0 2010
Aust-Cbus 14.1 0.0 2010
Aust-Firstsuper 0 7.5 2010
Aust-First State SA 3.5 2011
Aust-Future 8 0.0 2013
Aust-Health Super 4.6 2009
Aust-AusGov Superfund 6.7
Aust-Hesta 0.8 10.0 2010
Aust-Hosplus 0 4.0 2009
Aust-Military 9 0.0 2010
Aust-MTAA 31.1 25.0 2010
Aust-Q Super 6.2 2011
Aust-QIC 4 0.0 2010
Aust-State Super 1.9 0.0 2010
Aust-Sun Super 5.1 5.0 2013
Aust-Australian Super 9.8 14.0 2013
Aust-Retail Employees 13.8 2011
Aust-Reward 13.8 2011
Aust-Telstra 3 0.0 2010
Aust-Unisuper 4.4 6.5 2010
Aust-VIC 5.5 0.0 2010
Aust-West Schem 17.9 0.0 2010
Argentina-Sustainability Guarantee Fund 13.6 20.0 2013
Bras-Pension Funds 1.0 0.0 2010
Brasil-Previ 6.9 0.0 2013
Brasil-Funcef 6.9 0.0 2013
Brasil-Fapes 0.0 0.0 2013
Can-CPP Alberta 6.1 2012
Can-Caisse de Depo 1.4 8.8 2010
Can-CPP 6.1 2012
Can-CPPIB 5.5 0.0 2010
Can-OMERS 14.9 21.5 2013
Can-OTTP 8.4 8.5 2013
Can-PSP 6.1 2012
Can-Quebec Pension Plan 4.0 5.0 2013
Chil-AFP 1.2 0.0 2010
Chil-Provida 0.0 0.0 2013
Chil-Habitat 0.2 0.0 2013
Chil- Pension Reserve Fund 0.0 0.0 2013
Col-AFP 0.7 0.0 2010
Den-PFA 0.8 0.0 2013
Finland-Ilmarien 0.3 0.0 2013
Finland-Keva 0.0 0.0 2013
Israel-Menora-Mitvachim 2.9 0.0 2013
Japan-Pension Fund Association 0.1 0.0 2013
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Mex-AFORE 4.8 0.0 2010
Mex-AFORE XXI Banorte 0.3 5.0 2013
Mex-Banamex 1.8 2.5 2013
Ned- ABP 1.5 3.0 2013
Ned- PFZW 2.4 3.0 2013
Ned-PGGM 0.8 0.0 2010
Ned-PMT 0.6 1.0 2013
New Zealand-Superannuation Fund 1.9 0.0 2013
Per-AFP 3.7 0.0 2010
Portugal-BPI Pension Fund 3.3 0.0 2013
Portugal-CGD Staff ’s Pension Fund 1.6 1.6 2013
RSA-Gov Employees 0.1 0.0 2013
Swe- AP Fonden 0.8 0.0 2010
Swe- AP 4 0.0 0.0 2013
Swe- AP 3 1.4 2.0 2013
Spain-Endesa 0.0 0.0 2013
Spain-Fonditel 0.1 0.0 2013
Turkey -Oyak 4.4 0.0 2013
UK-USS 4.4 5.0 2013
USA-Alaska PFC 0.0 18.0 2010
USA-Calpers 0.0 3.0 2010
USA-MERS 0.0 5.0 2010
USA-Calsters 0.0 2.5 2010
USA-NYC Combined Retirement Service 0.0 0.0 2013
Sources : Derived by the authors from Inderst (2014), OECD (2014a), Tuesta (2013), Weber and
Alfen (2010), Future Fund Board (2011), Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2010), and
Macquarie (2009).
.
Infrastructures
Capital Markets 
Dynamization
GDPFiscal
Sustainability
Pension Funds
Labor Markets
Figure 10.1 Pension funds and infrastructure: the theoretical virtuous circle
Source : Authors’ depiction.
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funds and economic growth through various channels of transmission,
foremost among these being financial, fiscal, and labor market mechanisms.
The same figure highlights the role fulfilled by infrastructure and its impact
on growth, suggesting that pension funds could become the backers of
infrastructure projects and their effects on growth. A study by Alonso et al.
(2009) revealed that elasticity of growth with respect to infrastructure could
be between 7.0 and 13.5 percent.
Also in Figure 10.1, it is important to focus on the fiscal channel. This
could be positively affected, since the presence of the private sector means a
lower public borrowing requirement, thus reducing its vulnerability and
boosting growth. Likewise, capital markets play a major role through pen-
sion fund financing, by bringing more resources to economic agents,
greater efficiency, and improving fiscal sustainability.
It should be pointed out that for such a ‘virtuous circle’ between pension
funds and infrastructures to crystallize, there must be well-defined and
sound projects, a good financing vehicle for them, and an institutional
framework that enables the interests involved in carrying out infrastructure
projects to be harmoniously aligned in pursuit of the success of the
investment.
Ultra-low interest rates
Another important incentive for pension funds to think about investing in
infrastructure projects is the low interest rate environment. This type of
alternative asset could counterbalance the negative effects. In the case of
defined contribution (DC) plans, the low interest rate scenario has a direct
impact on the pension accumulation process, already threatened by rising
longevity. Systems with defined benefit (DB) pensions will have difficulties
in ensuring that their commitments comply with lower interest rates.
Why Might Pension Funds Invest in Infrastructure?
Beyond the forces that are driving forward the policy trends in favor of
pension funds investing in infrastructure projects, it is important to take into
account at least three relevant conceptual criteria.
The perspective of the pension fund member
Various reasons are cited by the literature as justification for greater
pension fund investment in infrastructure (Alonso et al. 2009). These can
be reduced to six basic concepts:
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(1) there is a neat fit between the pension fund portfolio and the long-
term time horizon for infrastructure projects to mature;
(2) infrastructure tends to operate like natural, regulated monopolies, or
oligopolies, with reduced or non-market competition, resulting in a
portfolio with more stable asset values;
(3) there is a low correlation between the assets in infrastructure projects
and other financial asset classes, which normally track the vicissitudes
of the economic cycle;
(4) infrastructure provides protection against inflation;
(5) it offers a good risk–return tradeoff; and
(6) infrastructure assets have greater cash-flow stability when the project
has matured.
In a nutshell, infrastructure offers an improved portfolio efficient frontier
(Andrews and Wahba 2007; Weber and Alfen 2010; Sawant 2010).
In spite of these attractive features of infrastructural investments, a lack
of statistical data can thwart attempts to examine this issue in depth. One
country that provides much information on this matter is Australia: Peng
and Newell (2007), Bird et al. (2012), Connolly (2012), and Inderst
(2014) all report high risk-adjusted returns and low correlations with
other asset classes in this context. Inderst (2014) states that some aspects
require deeper analysis, as many of these studies make their estimates
using small samples and valuations of unlisted infrastructure assets
based on expected values, which tends to underestimate volatility and
correlations to listed instruments, while overestimating potential portfolio
diversification.
Pension fund liabilities and their role in
investment selection
A decision to include infrastructure investments in a pension fund’s port-
folio should also depend on the characteristics of the pension liabilities. The
value of a liability is related to the expected benefit payments (the future
cash outflows) and the discount rate, which implies inherent risks that could
impose volatilities attributable to wages, inflation, and many non-market-
related factors. They also exhibit growth attributable to future service costs
and other non-market-related factors. Uncertainty in pension benefits varies
greatly by demographic group, with exposures which are either market-
related or not. During the recent financial crisis, many DB schemes did
experience funding problems; considering that infrastructure projects are
long-term investments, these could match the long duration of pension
liabilities (Della Croce 2012; Della Croce and Yermo 2013). Accessibility
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has also proven to be a problem in the past, particularly for smaller pension
schemes in the case of the UK (NAPF 2013).
Focusing on the characteristics of pension fund liabilities and the finan-
cial situation they are facing, it may be savvy for pension funds to increase
their exposure to long-term infrastructure. For instance, healthcare infra-
structure could be an interesting choice. Healthcare is poised to be the
most significant growth industry of the century, one of the few asset classes
that can generate consistently high returns according to Yun (2012).
A declining, aging population is a demographic headwind for most invest-
ment assets, but for healthcare it is a tailwind. Thus investing in healthcare
infrastructure could allow pension funds to isolate longevity risk, the vari-
able that most imbalances their revenues and obligations. Investing in the
healthcare sector may be a natural hedge for pension funds.
Limitations for investing in infrastructure
Investing in infrastructure is a very complicated endeavor, requiring the
alignment of several different stakeholder interests: shareholders, financial
institutions, regulators, insurance companies, constructors and operators of
infrastructure projects, suppliers of raw materials, and end users (Tuesta
2015). Besides that, a Special Purpose Vehicle designed for this end needs to
deal with different risks and coverages: construction (delays, extra costs,
technical failures), operational (insufficient production, increase in costs,
quality of the product), supply contract (deficit or supply, interruptions,
price of supply), financial markets (rates of return, currency), market
fluctuations (demand, price, delay in payments), and politics (expropri-
ation, political turmoil, regulation).
Accordingly, it may be difficult for a pension fund to deal with all the issues
and risks. In order to deal efficiently with an infrastructure portfolio, the
pension funds need to invest important resources inhuman capital anddevelop
adegreeof expertise that interplayswith thecharacteristic of theproject,market
functioning, and the institutional framework. This is probably themost import-
ant lesson learnt fromAustralia andCanada (Inderst 2014). From these country
cases, there are at least three areas that must be reinforced to facilitate the
participation of pension funds investing in infrastructure projects.
The availability of good projects
Pension funds face a combination of factors that disincentivize infrastruc-
ture investment. These are principally characterized by the relation of the
concession (or project finance) process and the different conditions in
each country’s domestic financial market. Additionally, there may be other
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barriers more specific to the sector, related to their technical capacity to
evaluate investment in this type of asset and country-specific regulation.
Project financing also involves inherent risks (OECD 2014d). For greenfield
projects, the risks are apparent at the time that the project is conceived, and
the construction risk can cause deviations in the costs of the project. In the
operational phase, there can be supply, operating, and market risks. The
latter are the most recurrent and appear when the expectations of the use
of the infrastructure fall to much lower levels than those initially estimated,
which affect the profitability of the operation. There are also other risks,
including regulatory, legal, and credit risk.
A more fundamental concern has to do with the scant availability of high-
quality investment projects. Although estimates by international institutions
indicate a broad availability of potential investment projects around the world,
in reality, available opportunities are much more limited. Depending on the
country, there are enormous differences in the tradition of private-sector
financing. In Europe, the usual procedure is that local development compan-
ies themselves undertake domestic infrastructure projects. For instance, in
Spain and Germany, most toll roads are financed by the public sector, while
in other countries, such as Portugal and France, they are financed by the
private sector. In addition, in developed countries, the more profitable infra-
structure projects have already been completed, while those still pending tend
to involve more risk and less certain profitability. In this context, one of the
proposals made by the European Commission (2014a, 2014b) to mitigate this
problem is the creation of a pipeline of infrastructure projects at a European
level that makes the necessary information available, such that any potential
institutional investor in any country can participate in financing a project.
Rule of law
Other equally important elements are those related to legal uncertainties
regarding contracts. Investors in public infrastructure need clear and stable
regulations, together with efficient contractual procedures (OECD 2014b).
This has not always been the case, however, and some governments
have changed the contractual terms of their concessions. For example, the
Spanish government has not complied with the contracts signed in solar
electricity generation and the developers have seen a cut in the price
per kilowatt-hour generated. This type of failure to comply can have an
enormous impact on a project’s financial return.
Risk mitigation tools
The regulatory framework for the financial sector (Basel II and III and
Solvency II) prioritizes the need to measure such risks and provide the
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necessary capital to cover them. Yet this presents a disincentive for some
institutions to finance infrastructure. Moreover, traditional insurers such as
monoline companies collapsed in the last financial crisis. Without such
insurance support, many infrastructure projects would be poorly rated by
the rating agencies. For example, the use of project bonds has shrunk since
2008, due to the lowered ratings on the monoline companies that had been
insuring them (OECD 2014d).
Many argue that the participation of international financial institutions
such as the World Bank, the International Development Bank, or the
European Investment Bank (EIB) has become fundamental in the wake of
the financial crisis. Nevertheless, public–private partnerships (PPPs) can be
seen as helpful in incentivizing the participation of the private sector in
financing infrastructure (World Bank 2011). Some projects might be
unviable from a financial point of view but might nonetheless be socially
viable or generate positive externalities. In such a case, the private sector
would not undertake the project unless it had some kind of guaranteed
minimum level of earnings that would ensure an appropriate return on
investment. Yet governments must ensure that the conditions for the infra-
structure investment provide value for money, in relation to construction
costs and underwriting risks.
Global Financial Regulation and Pension
Fund Investment in Infrastructure
When Basel II came into effect in 2004, it forced lending institutions to build
up capital to cover operating risks and market risk. Basel II allows the
entities to use internal models to calculate their risk-weighted assets. The
financial crisis in 2008–10 revealed the weaknesses of the system due to
the high leverage of the lending institutions, their liquidity problems, and
the low level and quality of their capital. Basel III is the consequence of this,
and it obliged the institutions to improve the quality and quantity of their
capital, enhance their risk management systems, reduce leverage, increase
liquidity, and take counter-cyclical measures.
Global financial regulation limits the participation
of banks in infrastructure projects
The consequences for infrastructure finance were immediate. First, finan-
cing entities became more risk-averse. Some countries have established a
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) of 50 percent, which practically eliminates
infrastructure projects. Second, the degree of coverage depends on the time
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horizon: the longer the time horizon, the higher the consumption of
capital. As financing infrastructure construction and operation is long-
term, this has provided a further disincentive to continuing investment.
In addition to the global legislation, there are also local regulations that
can have a negative impact on the development of products linked to
infrastructure. For example, infrastructure funds have been unsuccessful
in Spain because the solvency requirements for these funds when tendering
for PPP projects present an obstacle, as they normally manage funds that are
not in themselves corporate. These tenders are normally designed for
construction companies (CEOE 2013).
Pension fund investment in infrastructure
and its regulation
Infrastructure regulation is complex for several reasons. First, there is the
problem of defining what infrastructure to launch. Second, historical data
are insufficient to evaluate the possible impacts of this regulation. These
assets are supported by physical installations, so their characteristics will
determine the specific type of project finance. A project for investment in
a toll road is not the same as for a photovoltaic electricity generating plant,
or a hospital. Nor is a toll road connecting the two principal cities in a
country directly comparable with one connecting relatively unpopulated
areas, for example. In addition to the different types of infrastructure, the
type of investment project must reflect whether it is a greenfield investment,
or whether it is for the maintenance or improvement of a previously existing
asset (brownfield). The financing project must also consider whether the
investment is based on shares or debt, and also whether these instruments
are traded in an organized market. Sometimes the investment is directly to
build the infrastructure itself, while other times it is indirect through other
financial vehicles. Investments that have a direct link include, for example,
pension fund loans to the developer through project bonds, obligation
bonds, or by taking an equity stake in one or several specific infrastructure
assets through greenfield shares. Indirect investments would be made by
buying shares in quoted companies involved in infrastructure development,
or by buying into an infrastructure investment fund, whether quoted or not.
Given this wide range of possibilities, the ideal would almost be to establish
specific regulations for each project, although this is evidently impossible,
and therein lies the difficulty of specifying general regulations.
In several countries, pension funds investing in infrastructure assets have
done so within the limitations imposed by their respective financial invest-
ment regulations, the degree of sophistication of their respective capital
markets that allow or forbid this type of investment, and the pension fund’s
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technical possibility of accessing infrastructure financing, either direct or
indirect. Individual countries also adopt different regulatory responses to
this complexity, which varies between relying on total flexibility of pension
funds’ investment in infrastructure and imposing restrictions.
Geographies with extremely flexible financial regulation
Countries that have completely flexible regulations probably find that legis-
lating for investment in this type of asset is too expensive, given the enor-
mous diversity of the potential projects. They assume that the best entities to
assess the risks of the project are the investors themselves, and as such, only
establish that the investments should be ‘prudent’ and well planned (OECD
2014a). Adopting this model implies that the pension funds should have
the necessary knowledge to successfully evaluate each project. This group
typically comprises the Anglo-Saxon countries (UK, US, Australia, and
Canada), plus Belgium and the Netherlands, all of which establish no
quantitative limits on infrastructure investment.
Within this group, there is also a significant diversity in terms of the
investment policy adopted. For example, in Canada and Australia, the
instruments selected vary considerably. Canada has an interesting combin-
ation of direct investment in unlisted infrastructure asset projects; it has one
of the most developed project bond markets and at the same time invests a
significant proportion of its infrastructure portfolio abroad. Meanwhile,
Australia has developed great expertise in packaging the risks in special
financing vehicles managed by infrastructure funds, and it recently has
invested more actively in unlisted assets. We also note that pension fund
investment in Australian infrastructure was incentivized by the introduction
of an obligatory DC pension system, while in Canada this boost came from
very mature private DB pension funds (Inderst 2014).
Regulation of infrastructure investment by means
of limits or conditionality
Some countries set limits on pension fund investment in infrastructure. For
example, one-third of the countries analyzed by the OECD (2014a) did not
allow investment in private investment funds or via direct loans. Yet a
majority of the countries allow investment in private bonds (including
infrastructure bonds), though the limit is almost always lower than for
holdings of government bonds. Most countries do not allow investment in
unlisted shares and have limits for quoted assets, as is exemplified by various
Latin American countries. According to Tuesta (2015), Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, the countries with the most important private
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pension schemes in the region, are investing around 2.6 percent of their
total portfolios in infrastructure. Mexico is of particular note, which to date
has invested an average of 4.8 percent of its portfolio in infrastructure
projects.
The regulatory experience of these countries has been limited. The first
infrastructure bonds were developed under the 1998 monoline scheme in
Chile, which enabled the financing of that country’s key infrastructure.
Later on, this scheme had to be dropped, however, and current investments
in such assets occur via infrastructure funds. Mexico is leading the way in
developing packaged instruments for pension fund investment in such
projects, with the so-called Fibra (Real Estate Investment Trusts) and CKD
(Development Capital Certificate). Colombia, meanwhile, has developed
infrastructure bonds with limited government financing. Peru has opted for
trust funds to invest in infrastructure set up by the pension funds themselves;
these take stakes in infrastructure funds where they play an active role on the
board. Peru has also developed the so-called CRPI (Work in Progress
Certificates) for mega infrastructure projects that are more like public
works, as they have substantial guarantees from government tax revenues.
All the Latin American infrastructure investments have some type of
quantitative limitation, either direct, in the case of identifying the special
vehicle itself, or indirect, such as the general quantitative cap for debt or
equity instruments. Countries such as Colombia and Mexico have set limits
on their infrastructure investment vehicles that vary depending on the risk
profiles of the workers participating in the pension funds and of the port-
folios in which the funds are invested (Tuesta 2015). In the case of Mexico,
these can be up to 12 percent, while in Colombia the limit is 7 percent of
certain portfolios.
The case of Europe
Several efforts have been made to encourage institutional infrastructure
investment in Europe in recent years (European Commission 2014a,
2014b). Nonetheless, the enormous diversity of pension systems has so far
prevented regulation of a common infrastructure investment market.
Within the EU, national legislation predominates, with significant differ-
ences between the least restrictive countries regarding such investments
(Belgium, with 10.58 percent) and the strictest (Spain, 6.06 percent) (see
Appendix and results in Table 10.2).
In 2009, the European Commission proposed a directive on Alternative
Investment Fund Managers (AIFMs) with the objective of creating a regula-
tory and supervisory framework for AIFMs at a European level, which would
make the management of these funds more transparent for both the
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authorities and investors (European Commission 2014a, 2014b). The body
responsible for regulating pension funds in Europe (EIOPA) proposed the
IORP and IORP II directives to homogenize national legislation on occupa-
tional pension funds with the requirements of Solvency II. In other words,
the European focus prioritizes solvency and active risk management
through models that allow the appropriate evaluation of the associated
risks, not forgetting the required pillar of control and reporting.
Although EIOPA has recognized the importance of infrastructure for
economic growth and its potential advantage for pension funds, it cautions
that more work needs to be done and consultations carried out before any
common legislation can be passed. In this respect, EIOPA proposed a
discussion paper which first establishes how the various infrastructure and
other long-term assets should be treated within the Solvency II framework,
and for what type of financial investor (2013). EIOPA considers that the
preferred type of investment for insurance companies in long-term assets
would be direct project finance (bonds, loans, or equity), infrastructure
investment funds (listed and unlisted), and infrastructure loan securitiza-
tion vehicles.2
TABLE 10.2. Index of regulatory liberalization for the investment of pension funds in
infrastructure
Country Index Country Index Country Index Country Index
Belgium 10.58 Sweden 7.93 Iceland 6.01 Zambia 4.91
Canada 10.58 Germany 7.93 Jordan 6.01 Nigeria 4.57
Ireland 10.58 South Korea 7.78 Switzerland 5.68 Nigeria 4.57
Netherlands 10.58 Portugal 7.61 Brazil 5.68 Romania 4.57
Gibraltar 10.58 United States 7.59 Malta 5.66 Czech Republic 4.33
Malta 10.58 Hungary 7.22 Poland 5.50 Albania 4.18
Malawi 10.22 Greece 6.80 Bulgaria 5.50 Colombia 4.18
Australia 9.86 Mauritius 6.79 Slovak
Republic
5.32 China 4.18
United Kingdom 9.86 Austria 6.74 Armenia 5.31 Pakistan 4.18
Israel 9.85 Italy 6.47 Armenia 5.31 Russian Federation 3.98
New Zealand 9.83 Turkey 6.47 Costa Rica 5.29 Maldives 3.79
Norway 8.71 France 6.43 Slovenia 5.29 Egypt 3.74
Japan 8.41 Thailand 6.10 Tanzania 5.29 Dominican
Republic
3.38
Estonia 8.36 Trinidad and
Tobago
6.07 Peru 5.29 Chile 3.07
Jamaica 8.31 South Africa 6.07 Kenya 4.93 Uganda 3.02
Luxembourg 7.95 Spain 6.06 Republic of
Macedonia
4.93 India 2.30
Finland 7.94 Mexico 6.04 Namibia 4.91 Ukraine 2.25
Source : Derived by the authors from OECD (2014a).
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The most advanced initiative that tries to mitigate the problems noted is
the Europe 2020 project bond initiative under the auspices of the EIB. The
EIB plays a role like the former monoline insurers, covering greenfield
infrastructure risks and providing the projects with an adequate credit
rating. More specifically, the principal characteristics would be as follows:
limiting loss coverage below 20 percent; aiming for an ‘A’ rating for the
project (the minimum requirement for pension funds and insurance com-
pany asset portfolios); the possibility of subordinated loans from the EIB
based on their financial situation and rating; and selecting the project
finance or PPP projects available for audit by the EIB itself. In 2015,
EIOPA created a working group to define what types of infrastructure
investment offer predictable cash flows in the long term with well-identified
risks. This group is also evaluating criteria for new types of infrastructure
assets including transparency and standardization.
What Variables Have Influenced Pension
Fund Investment in Infrastructure?
The Empirical Evidence
As we have noted, both regulatory and non-regulatory factors may encour-
age or discourage the participation of pension funds in infrastructure
funding. In this section we propose a model to quantify which factors are
most empirically relevant.
Data
Our data come from several sources. Information on pension investment
regulation and aspects of the institutional and business environment is
available in several OECD publications and the World Economic Forum
USA’s report. To determine which variables could affect the investment of
pension funds in infrastructure, we use three sets of variables.
A first group of variables was collected from the OECD (2014a), with data
as of December 2013. This report contains information about all forms of
restriction and legal regulation for pension funds to invest in infrastruc-
tures. Variables refer to the limits on OECD and selected non-OECD pen-
sion funds investment in several asset categories (equity, real estate, bonds,
retail investment funds, private investment funds, loans, and bank deposits).
Information is also available on whether the assets are domestic or foreign.
A second set of variables is taken from the World Economic Forum USA
(2012), with data on institutional and business environments, financial stabil-
ity, non-banking financial services, and financial access. One subset focuses
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on the capital account liberalization and the quality of overall infrastructure,
both standardized on a scale from one (least) to seven (most).
A second subset is formed by an index of the strength of legal rights, the
strength of investor protection index, and a financial strength indicator.
These three factors take values from zero (worst) to 10 (best). The third
subset includes the number of procedures to enforce a contract (in number
of days) and the share of total number of securitization deals (as a percent-
age of total deals).
A supplementary group of variables is available in OECD (2014c) which
tracks trends in pension fund financial performance (assets, investments,
and industry structure). In particular, variables selected refer to the import-
ance of pension fund assets as a share of GDP, the percentage of non-
financial corporate bonds with respect to total bonds, and the amount of
DB pension plans’ assets as a percentage of total assets.
As the dependent variable we use the investment of pension funds in
infrastructure (OECD 2014b). Here the total investment in infrastruc-
ture includes assets belonging to sectors such as transport, telecommunica-
tions, utilities, and energy. Pension funds can access infrastructure through
different channels and the infrastructure investment (as a percentage of
total investment) can be distinguished by three different categories: unlisted
equity, listed equity, and debt. In this study, we consider the total amount of
infrastructure investment (total infrastructure investment = unlisted equity +
listed equity + debt). Table 10.3 provides further details on all variables.
Our unit of observation is the pension fund, not the country. Given the
legislation of several countries (in alphabetical order, Armenia, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Nigeria,
Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, and South Korea), these coun-
tries have different types of pension funds with different conditions of
financial regulation and levels of investment. To study the effect of financial
regulation and the institutional framework on the weight of the investment
of pension funds in infrastructure, we use a Tobit model. The use of this
model is conditioned by the particular characteristics of the dependent
variable. The dependent variable is observed only over some interval, so
we see a mixture of observations with zero and positive values. Therefore,
the likelihood function has to take into account this particularity and
involves additional computational complications.
The financial regulation is associated to the financial product considered.
The high number of variables compared to the small number of observa-
tions and the limitations derived from the information of the variables
require the use of principal components methodology. This procedure
allows aggregating the information into two indicators: the portfolio limit
in domestic asset categories and the portfolio limit in foreign asset categor-
ies (see Appendix).
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TABLE 10.3. Variable descriptions
Variable Description Source
Portfolio limit in
domestic asset
categories
Relying on the OECD’s report about the
restrictions and regulation of pension funds, this
index is created to measure how easy it is to make
investments in different types of domestic assets.
The OECD’s report includes seven categories:
equity, real estate, bonds, retail investment funds,
private investment funds, loans, and bank deposits.
Different codes are used for each of them
depending on the existent regulation or
restrictions, the higher the value for this index, the
higher degree of flexibility when investing.
BBVA Research,
OECD (2014a)
Portfolio limit in
foreign asset
categories
Relying on the OECD’s report about the
restrictions and regulation of pension funds, this
index is created to measure how easy it is to make
investments in different types of foreign assets.
Seven categories are also included in this variable:
equity, real estate, bonds, retail investment funds,
private investment funds, loans, and bank deposits.
Different codes are used for each of them
depending on the existent regulation or
restrictions, the higher the value for this index, the
higher degree of flexibility when investing.
BBVA Research,
OECD (2014a)
Capital account
liberalization
This index measures the degree of capital account
liberalization within a country, standardized on a
scale from 1 (least liberalized) to 7 (most
liberalized). This variable includes the level of
capital controls based on information from the
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions, the Legal and Regulatory
Issues subpillar and the Bond Market
Development subpillar of the Financial
Development Index included in The Financial
Development Report 2012.
World Economic
Forum USA Inc.
(2012)
Quality of overall
infrastructure
It includes the assessment of general
infrastructure in each country (e.g., transport,
telephony and energy) on a scale from 1
(extremely underdeveloped) to 7 (extensive and
efficient by international standards).
World Economic
Forum USA Inc.
(2012)
Strength of legal
rights index
This indexmeasures the degree to which collateral
and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of
borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending.
The index ranges from 0 to 10 (the higher the
score, the better are collateral and bankruptcy laws
designed to expand access to credit).
World Economic
Forum USA Inc.
(2012)
Strength of investor
protection index
This index is the average of the extent of
disclosure index, the extent of director liability
index, and the ease of shareholder suits index.
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values
indicating more investor protection.
World Economic
Forum USA Inc.
(2012)
(continued)
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TABLE 10.3. Continued
Variable Description Source
Number of
procedures to
enforce a contract
This variable is the number of procedures from
the moment the plaintiff files a lawsuit in court
until the moment of payment. A procedure is
defined as any interaction between the parties, or
between them and the judge or the court officer
(e.g., steps to file the case, steps for trial and
judgment, and steps necessary to enforce the
judgment).
World Economic
Forum USA Inc.
(2012)
Importance of
pension funds
relative to the size of
the economy in the
OECD
This indicator measures the market value of
pension funds’ assets relative to the size of the
economy: in this case, it is measured by the GDP.
OECD (2014c)
DB pension plans’
assets as % of total
assets
This indicator reflects the relation among total
investment of DB plans and total investment.
OECD Stats
(2015)
Financial strength
indicator
This indicator is a weighted average of financial
strength rating by bank assets. It is a measure of a
country’s banks’ ability to meet obligations to
depositors and other creditors. It incorporates
quantitative and qualitative information on a
country’s banks’ operating environment (only
larger banks are included in each country).
World Economic
Forum USA Inc.
(2012)
Non-financial
corporate bonds to
total bonds and
notes outstanding
(%)
Total amount of domestic nonfinancial corporate
bonds and notes outstanding to total amount of
domestic bonds and notes outstanding, both
corporate and noncorporate.
BIS (2015)
Share of total
number of
securitization deals
It is the three-year average of the sum of asset-
backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed
securities (MBS), high-yield bonds, and highly
leveraged loans deals as % of total deals.
World Economic
Forum USA Inc.
(2012)
Anglosphere
countries
Countries in which English is the first language of
the majority of the population and other countries
which present possess substantial English
knowledge dating back to the British Empire.
EU countries Countries corresponding to one of the 28 current
member states of the European Union (from 2013
onwards).
EFTA countries Countries belonging to the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), an intergovernmental
organization created for the promotion of free
trade and economic integration. Its members are
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
Latin American and
Caribbean countries
Considering the following countries: Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and
Trinidad and Tobago.
Source : Authors’ derivations from sources listed.
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Geographic binary variables are also included in the model. Several areas
are considered: Anglosphere countries in a broad sense (those countries in
which English is the first language of the majority of the population and
those countries with substantial English knowledge) dating back to the
British Empire, EU countries, EFTA countries, and Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Table 10.4 presents the main descriptive statistics of
all the variables.
Pension funds can access infrastructure through different channels. We
follow the OECD (2014b) in considering infrastructure investment in
unlisted equity, listed equity, and debt, which we aggregate to obtain the
fraction of infrastructure investment relative to total investment. The aver-
age value shows that the investment of pension funds in these assets repre-
sents a small part of the total, though this varies widely across countries.
Several countries do not invest anything in infrastructure, whereas countries
like Portugal, Canada, Brazil, and Australia have a significant pension fund
participation in infrastructure.
Focusing on the portfolio limits in domestic and foreign asset categories,
the results suggest that the investment of pension funds in domestic asset
TABLE 10.4. Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Total infrastructure investment (as % of total investments) 3.104 8.843 0 51.3
Portfolio limit in domestic asset categories 5.847 2.8 0 10.579
Portfolio limit in foreign asset categories 1.891 2.515 0 9.848
Capital account liberalization 5.199 2.026 1 7
Quality of overall infrastructure 5.033 1.042 2.83 6.64
Strength of legal rights index 6.456 2.105 3 10
Strength of investor protection index 5.825 1.368 3 9
Number of procedures to enforce a contract 32.93 5.454 21 46
Importance of pension funds relative to the
economy in OECD
24.105 35.449 0 166.3
DB pension plans’ assets as % of total assets 20.329 35.506 0 100
Financial strengths indicator 4.561 2.044 0 9
Non-financial corporate bonds to total bonds and
notes outstanding (%)
6.722 11.297 0 36.21
Share of total number of securitization deals 2.13 7.27 0.02 53.63
Anglosphere countries (broad version) 0.123 0.331 0 1
EU countries 0.474 0.504 0 1
EFTA countries 0.018 0.132 0 1
Latin American and Caribbean countries 0.105 0.31 0 1
Sources : Derived by the authors fromOECD (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) andWorld Economic Forum
USA Inc. (2012).
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categories overtakes the investment in foreign assets. Regulation for domes-
tic categories is often more comprehensive than for foreign ones.
Regarding the capital account liberalization, which measures the degree
of capital account liberalization within a country, the mean shows that the
liberalization degree is quite high (a value of 5.2 with seven as the maximum
value). However, there is high inequality, as shown by the value of the
standard deviation.
The quality of overall infrastructure takes into account the business
environment and assesses the infrastructure (transport, telephony, energy,
etc.) in the country. An index standardized on a scale from one (extremely
underdeveloped) to seven (extensive and efficient) is used. Themean shows
that the infrastructure in the countries analyzed is developed (5.8, and 6.64
is the maximum value), but it does not reach high levels of efficiency. The
countries with the best performance in this index are Switzerland and
Finland. Least developed countries along this dimension are Romania,
Tanzania, and Nigeria.
The strength of legal rights index refers to the degree to which collateral
and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus
facilitate lending). In the case of the first variable, the protection of the rights
of borrowers and lenders is similar to the average (6.5). Yet significant differ-
ences across the countries are observed. Countries like Kenya, South Africa,
and the UK have a high level of protection and thus access to credit. By
contrast, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Italy, Portugal, and the Russian Federation
present a low index, indicating vulnerability and difficulties in accessing credit.
In relation to investor protection, the average value shows that the major-
ity of the countries are around the mean (6.0). We can highlight the
position of some countries such as Canada, Colombia, and Ireland, where
the protection index almost reaches the maximum, while other countries,
such as Austria, Greece, and Switzerland, present low values of this index.
The number of procedures required to enforce a contract measures the
number of procedures from the moment the plaintiff files a lawsuit in court
until the moment of payment. The mean value shows that almost 33 pro-
cedures are needed. In general, countries range between 30 and 40 proced-
ures except some extraordinary cases, such as Ireland, which only requires
21 procedures, versus Pakistan and India, which need 46 procedures.
Most pension funds are small relative to the size of the economy, though
cross-country differences are remarkable. In most countries, pension funds
represent less than 10 percent of the economy. But in a few, like Australia,
Iceland, the Netherlands, and the UK, the relative size of pension funds to
the economy exceeds 100 percent.
We also measure DB pension plan assets as a percentage of total assets. The
mean value of this variable shows that DB pensions are not widespread, but
the large standard deviation confirms notable differences among countries.
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The indicator of financial strengths is the weighted average of the finan-
cial strengths rating by bank assets. The mean value is 4.6 and it ranges from
four to six. Only a few countries such as Canada and Australia have higher
values.
Concerning the share of non-financial corporate bonds relative to the
total bonds and notes outstanding, the data indicate a very low percentage
with high variability. In the Russian Federation and South Korea, these
products represent 30 percent of the total, while for the other countries
this percentage is much lower.
The share of the total number of securitization deals shows the three-year
average of the sum of asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities,
high-yield bonds, and highly leveraged loans deals, as a percentage of total
deals. As the mean and the standard deviation suggest, there is a huge
disparity among the countries analyzed because securitization deals repre-
sent less than 1 percent of total deals for most. This percentage reaches
53.63 percent in the US.
The model
To incorporate the information on these variables, the results of the regres-
sion models are presented in Table 10.5.
Model 1 includes as regressors only the financial regulation variables.
Coefficient estimates on the portfolio asset limit suggest that a reduction
of the limits in domestic assets significantly raises infrastructure investment
as a percentage of the total, but this effect is not statistically different from
zero in the case of foreign asset limits. Therefore, the main restriction for
infrastructure investment by pension funds comes from domestic assets.
These results indicate that much work remains to be done in the field of
financial regulation.
Model 2 includes financial regulation variables as well as other variables
associated with general regulation, legislation, institutional factors, and
pension characteristics. The effect of financial regulation now becomes
negative in both cases, but negligible in the domestic option and slightly
significant for the foreign assets. The importance of other factors also
determines the relationship between financial regulation and investment
decisions, which do not exclusively depend on portfolio limits.
The degree of capital account liberalization, the strength of the legal
rights index (measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy
laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders), and the importance of
pension funds relative to the size of the economy are all significant. The
investor protection index has a negative and slightly significant effect on the
percentage of infrastructure investment. A potential explanation comes
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from the tradeoff between protection levels and pension fund investment
opportunities, versus other investors in the context of infrastructure. Other
variables considered are not statistically different from zero.
Further details relating to the financial system are included in Model 3,
and results reinforce our observations from Model 2. Only the importance
of pension funds relative to the size of the economy declines in significance.
The financial system instruments variable has a positive and significant
coefficient, establishing a direct relationship between flexibility, size, and
development degree of the financial markets and the level of pension fund
infrastructure investment.
A last group of variables is included in Model 4, related to geographic
area. The results confirm the importance of all factors considered in
Model 3. The geographic effects suggest that country characteristics affect-
ing the percentage of pension fund infrastructure investments are especially
important in the EU, EFTA, Latin American, and Caribbean countries.
TABLE 10.5. Tobit model coefficient estimatesa
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Portfolio limit in domestic asset categories 2.58c 1.73 2.79 4.85
Portfolio limit in foreign asset categories 0.40 2.34d 4.66c 4.93
Capital account liberalization 6.40c 12.87b 49.61c
Quality of overall infrastructure 5.96 19.50c 65.18c
Strength of legal rights index 4.24d 4.84c 15.04c
Strength of investor protection index 5.96d 11.73b 38.67c
Number of procedures to enforce a contract 0.23 1.62 5.55c
Importance of pension funds relative to the
economy in OECD
0.19d 0.09 0.07
DB pension plans’ assets as % of total assets 0.04 0.01 0.39c
Financial strengths indicator 9.00c 32.41c
Non-financial corporate bonds to total bonds and
notes outstanding (%)
0.94c 5.14c
Share of total number of securitization deals 0.34d 2.14c
Anglosphere countries (broad version) 47.65
EU countries 140.59c
EFTA countries 90.24d
Latin American and Caribbean countries 94.61b
Constant 33.142b 0.628 69.281 29.45
No. of observations 57 57 57 57
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.088 0.147 0.23
Log pseudolikelihood 80.655 74.884 70.026 63.68
Notes:
a Dependent variable: pension fund infrastructure investment (as % of total investments).
b Denotes estimates significant to 1%.
c Denotes estimates significant to 5%.
d Denotes estimates significant to 10%.
Source: OECD (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) and World Economic Forum USA Inc. (2012).
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Other results in Model 4 confirm the relevance of the development of
financial protection, stability and fairness of legal rights, and the quality and
strength of financial institutions. Financial market development also has
positive and significant effects on the percentage of pension fund infrastruc-
ture investment.
Conclusion
This research explored factors driving pension fund investments in infra-
structure projects. Pension investments in infrastructure could be attractive
to the extent that these assets offer less correlation than other financial
assets in their portfolios, better risk–return features, and long maturities. Yet
investing in infrastructure projects is also risky and requires much expertise.
Pension regulations are adapting to allow pension funds to become more
involved in infrastructure projects. Australia and Canada have a regulatory
framework that allows them to invest with enormous flexibility, and appar-
ently with success. Current discussions in Europe are taking place in the
context of the development of a Capital Markets Union, as the EU seeks to
deal with the different countries’ regulatory issues. In Latin America, spe-
cialized financial vehicles have been developed for pension funds to invest
in infrastructure, especially in Mexico.
Our empirical analysis also shows that the degree of development in the
financial markets (i.e., capital account liberalization, non-financial corpor-
ate bonds as a share of the total bonds and notes outstanding, and the share
of total number of securitization deals) is positively associated with infra-
structure investment.
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Appendix: Measuring the Regulatory Flexibility of
Pension Fund Infrastructure Investment through a
Synthetic Index
In an attempt to homogenize and standardize the diversity of regulations on
pension fund infrastructure investment, we create an index that measures
how much of an opening or facility these funds have to make this kind of
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investment. We use principal component analysis (PCA), which is the stat-
istical technique for data reduction. PCA uses an orthogonal transformation
to convert a set of observations of possibly correlated variables into a set of
values of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components.
PCA is mathematically defined as an orthogonal linear transformation.
This transformation is defined in such a way that the first principal compo-
nent has the largest possible variance (and thus accounts for as much of the
variability in the data as possible), and each succeeding component in turn
has the highest variance possible under the constraint that it is orthogonal to
the preceding components.
The OECD (2014a) reports details of the regulation for each financial
product describing different forms of restriction and legal regulation on
pension funds. The products are Equity, Real Estate, Bonds, Retail Invest-
ment Funds, Private Investment Funds, Loans, and Bank Deposits. We use
four different codes for each product (not allowed to invest, allowed with
restrictions, allowed with restrictions and with exceptions in some particular
cases, and allowed with no limit). Therefore, a higher value of this indicator
(for any product) implies a higher degree of flexibility. Each country’s laws
also distinguish between portfolio limits on pension fund investment in
(_in) or outside (_out) the country using these seven asset categories.
The PCA procedure allows aggregating the information of the seven
products in two indicators, the portfolio limit in domestic asset categories
and the portfolio limit in foreign asset categories:
Portfolio limit in domestic asset categories = 0.3850 Equity_in + 0.3640
 Real Estate_in + 0.3863  Bonds_in + 0.3896  Retail Investment
Funds_in + 0.3832  Private Investment Funds_in + 0.3603  Loans_in
+ 0.3763  Bank Deposits_in
Portfolio limit in foreign asset categories = 0.3992 Equity_out + 0.3439
 Real Estate_out + 0.4142  Bonds_out + 0.4113  Retail Investment
Funds_out + 0.3615  Private Investment Funds_out + 0.3111  Loans_
out + 0.3927  Bank Deposits_out
The values of the weights of these two formulas correspond to the results
derived from the first principal component (eigenvector) for each set of
products. The weights in both cases are similar among the financial products,
although the differences seem to be higher in the foreign asset categories.
Results show that countries with regulations allowing pension fund invest-
ment in infrastructure are those of Anglo-Saxon origin, followed by those
from northern Europe and Japan. Many developed countries have restrict-
ive legislation including Spain, France, Italy, and Switzerland. In developing
regions, especially in Africa and one or two in Latin America, very restrictive
regulations are in place.
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Endnotes
1. At the recent meeting of the International Organisation of Pension Supervisors
(IOPS) and the International Organisation of Pension Funds Supervisory Author-
ities (AIOS) in San José, Costa Rica, on Feb. 2015, this topic took a starring role in
the discussions.
2. It does not specify if this would also apply to pension funds.
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